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Abstract 
In some recent merger cases the European Commission has relied on quantitative economic 
techniques in the competitive assessment of horizontal mergers. These techniques have 
ranged from the use of merger simulation models (for both differentiated and homogenous 
goods), to the deployment of direct estimation methods to study the effects of relevant events 
in the past. This article describes the appropriate use of these quantitative techniques, and it 
explains the rationale for the reliance on these methods. It also explains why the evidence 
from economic modelling is complementary to more traditional qualitative evidence on the 
expected impact of horizontal mergers. 
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The European Commission’s Directorate General for Competition often relies on quantitative 
economic analysis in its review of complex mergers. This analysis is typically developed 
during in-depth investigations (so-called Phase II reviews). There is a range of economic 
techniques that can be applied to the competitive assessment of mergers. The choice of the 
relevant economic methodology depends on the features of the market at hand, on the key 
questions raised by the merger, and on the availability of suitable data. 
Quantitative economic methods applied by the Commission to the assessment of 
mergers are often one of two broad types: merger simulation techniques and direct estimation 
methods. Merger simulations seek to approximate the effects of a merger on the main 
competitive variable of interest (typically price) through an internally coherent assumed 
model of competition in the industry which takes account of important observed or measured 
market features (such as substitution patterns and margins). 
Direct estimation methods, on the other hand, seek to study the impact of past events 
in the markets at hand, using historical data. For example, direct estimation techniques can be 
used to measure the impact of past entry events (typically involving one or both of the 
merging parties) or past mergers. The insights from the direct estimation of past competitive 
events’ impact can then be used to make inferences on the possible effects of the merger at 
hand. 
In this article we review the Commission’s recent application of these two families of 
quantitative economic methods in merger control.
1
 
Merger simulations 
The Commission has relied on merger simulation techniques in a number of recent cases. 
There have been two main applications of these techniques: mergers in mobile telephony 
markets and two mergers in industrial commodities (specifically, in stainless steel and in the 
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chemicals sector). In the first application (mobile telephony markets), the Commission 
applied simulation techniques that are suitable for pricing of differentiated products (as 
described in Section 6.1 of the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines).
2
 In the second 
application, the Commission deployed a model that is more suitable to the analysis of 
competition in homogeneous product markets in the presence of fixed industry capacity 
(which is more closely related to issues described in Section 6.3 of the U.S. Merger 
Guidelines). 
The main objective of merger simulations in these cases has been to obtain an estimate 
of the order of magnitude of the likely effect of the relevant mergers on prices, based on an 
internally coherent model of competition that is capable of reflecting several of the key 
competitive variables of each market. The use of these techniques allowed for extensive 
sensitivity analysis of the simulation based on an alternative set of input parameters and for 
direct balancing of the efficiency claims made by the merging parties. 
While useful for a quantitative assessment of certain key features of the merger within 
a tractable model of the industry, simulation models necessarily abstract from some 
potentially relevant features. In all the cases where merger simulation techniques were 
employed, the results were hence integrated with the qualitative evidence on the likely effects 
of the merger (e.g., from the review of internal documents and from views of market 
participants), and read in conjunction with this evidence. The results of the merger 
simulations were therefore only one of the elements used by the Commission to come to its 
overall assessment of the relevant mergers.
3
 
Pricing of differentiated products in mobile telephony markets 
The Commission has reviewed a series of horizontal mergers in mobile telephony markets 
since 2012, including mergers in Austria (2012), Ireland (2014), Germany (2014), Denmark 
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(case withdrawn in September 2015), the UK (2016), and Italy (2016).
4
 A merger raising 
similar issues in the Spanish telecommunication market was approved in 2015.
5
 Each of these 
mergers implied a reduction in the number of mobile network operators, or infrastructure 
competitors, from four to three. 
In each of these cases (with the exception of the first case in Austria in 2012
6
) the 
Commission used a merger simulation that estimated the likely impact of the merger on retail 
prices for each operator and for the market as a whole, on the basis of a number of inputs 
(including most notably profit margins and diversion ratios across competitors). These merger 
simulations can be seen as an application of the price pressure techniques described in Section 
6.1 of the U.S. Merger Guidelines.
7
  
The basic idea behind price pressure techniques is to approximate the unilateral effects 
of a horizontal merger. The incentive of the merged entity to increase prices flows from the 
fact that prior to the merger neither of the merging parties internalizes the fact that setting a 
higher price diverts sales and profits to the other party. This diversion is internalized by the 
merger, thus leading to an increased potential for higher prices. The incentive to raise price, 
and hence the predicted price effects by the parties, are greater the greater the diversion of 
sales between the parties (in reaction to a price increase) and the higher the profit margin on 
the additional units sold by each of the merging parties.
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Pricing pressure techniques are typically based on the assumption of Bertrand-Nash 
competition between firms offering differentiated products (i.e., the standard competition 
model for pricing of differentiated products). They can be applied just to the prices of the 
merging parties, but can also be extended to account for the additional effect on the pricing of 
non-merging parties (feedback or equilibrium effects), in order to approximate the overall 
impact of the merger on market prices.
9
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In the mobile telephony cases, the Commission used a merger simulation model based 
on this standard competition model. The number of competitors to the merging parties is fixed 
by assumption in this model, and therefore the simulation is not suited to analyze the issue of 
possible entry by other firms following the merger. When barriers to entry are high (as the 
Commission found in the mobile telephony market) this assumption is likely to be reasonable. 
The model was populated with diversion ratios between each operator using number 
portability data available in each market. This data records the origin and destination 
operators for consumers who port their numbers when switching between operators (which 
does not necessarily capture price-based switching only). In some of the more recent cases, 
the Commission supplemented the portability data with the results of a consumer survey 
designed to measure diversion between the merging parties on the basis of hypothetical 
changes in price, to better approximate price-based substitution. Diversion between operators 
was computed at both the mobile network level and at the retail level (accounting for the 
presence of “virtual” network operators who access the infrastructure of mobile network 
operators). Diversion ratios at the retail level are lower by design than diversion ratios at the 
network level (since they include more competitors), and therefore predict lower likely price 
effects of the merger.
10
  
The profit margins used in the simulation were derived from accounting data 
submitted by the operators (measuring both direct and contribution margins), supplemented 
by additional information on additional incremental costs (e.g., incremental network costs) 
provided by the merging parties and assessed by the Commission. 
To estimate the likely impact of the merger on final prices, the model assumed that the 
demand faced by each operator is linear in price (that is, the change in quantity demanded in 
response to a change in price has a constant ratio). This assumption implies a lower degree of 
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pass-on of any given upwards pricing pressure to the final price, and hence leads to lower 
estimates of the final effect of a merger on prices than many other standard assumptions on 
demand (e.g., constant elasticity demand or logit demand).
11
 An assumption on aggregate 
demand elasticity (i.e., the reduction in total demand in response to higher prices) was also 
considered by the Commission in its merger simulations.
12
 
To take a concrete example of this exercise, consider the merger between H3G and O2 
in Ireland (cleared by the Commission subject to remedies in 2014). In its final decision
13
 the 
Commission reported illustrative price rises (IPR) for the two merging parties (i.e., price 
increases by the parties assuming other firms hold their prices constant) in the range of 4–9 
percent for the main segment of overlap (the post-paid private segment), based on sensitivities 
on the level of profit margins (using both contribution and incremental margins), and on the 
diversion to an outside good (considering a case with 0 percent diversion and 20 percent 
diversion). 
The Commission also reported the results of the merger simulations accounting for 
equilibrium reactions by rivals. Under this scenario, the increase in prices of the two merging 
parties was higher than under the IPR (given that rivals respond to the merger by also 
increasing prices, thus making a further price increase by the merging parties profitable). The 
market-wide effect of the merger, considering both the price increase of the merging parties 
and that of non-merging parties, was computed to be in the range of 4–9 percent in the post-
paid private segment, and 3–7 percent in the overall private segment (including both pre-paid 
and post-paid contracts). The Commission considered these price effects to be significant and 
not outweighed by the efficiencies substantiated by the merging parties. 
The reliance on merger simulation techniques can yield several benefits, as illustrated 
by the Commission’s experience in the assessment of the recent series of mobile mergers. 
7 
 
First, it provides a quantitative estimate of the impact of the loss of competition due to 
the merger, thus helping to substantiate whether a transaction may be expected to lead to a 
significant lessening of competition. The estimation of the likely price effects can be subject 
to extensive robustness analysis by considering different input assumptions (e.g., on the level 
of diversion ratios, on the level of margins, and on the aggregate elasticity of demand). This 
increases the reliability of a conclusion on whether the merger is likely to result in a 
significant lessening of competition. 
Second, the quantification of price effects from a merger simulation can be useful to 
complement qualitative evidence commode on the effect of consolidation in mobile telephony 
markets, including the documentary evidence found in some of these cases on the “market 
repair” benefits of consolidation (effectively a euphemism for higher prices and profits), on 
expectation of more “rational pricing,” and/or on the additional revenue expected from the 
merger by removing a competitor.
14
 
Third, the merger simulation allows for a quantification of likely consumer harm 
which can be offset against substantiated efficiency claims. Merger simulations can deal with 
variable cost efficiencies in a straightforward way, given that the framework applies the same 
assumption to the pass-on of upward pricing pressure from a merger and to the pass-on of 
downwards pricing pressure from a cost reduction. This allows for an internally coherent 
balancing exercise.
15
 
Pricing pressure models can in principle also allow for efficiencies in the form of 
quality increase following a merger.
16
 In most of the recent mobile telephony mergers, the 
parties claimed that the transactions would lead to higher network quality (e.g., in terms of 
network coverage and speed), and therefore be procompetitive. In practice, the Commission 
did not use the prediction from the merger simulation in the mobile telephony cases to balance 
8 
 
harm against the benefits from higher network quality, given that it concluded that the claims 
made by the parties were either not verifiable or not merger-specific (most notably because 
substantially the same benefits could be achieved by less restrictive alternatives, such as 
network sharing).
17
  
Pricing of homogenous goods in commodity markets  
The Commission has also used a merger simulation model in two recent cases involving 
industrial commodities (Outokumpu/Inoxum
18
 and Ineos/Solvay
19
).
20
 The Commission chose a 
Bertrand-Edgeworth (BE) framework in these cases, which analyses price competition 
between firms offering homogeneous products subject to fixed production capacities for each 
firm. 
In both cases the respective industry was characterized by overcapacity stemming 
from investment decisions made in the past under different market conditions. The level of 
plant capacities did not seem to be a major decision variable by firms at the time of the 
investigations. Moreover, consumers in these industries choose among competing suppliers 
largely on the basis of price. The BE framework hence seemed appropriate to assess these 
cases and preferable over alternatives models for homogeneous product markets, which 
assume that firms compete in quantities (directly or through capacity adjustments). The 
assumption of price competition in homogeneous products was also in line with the merging 
parties’ submissions on the nature of competition in these industries. 
Absent any capacity constraints (and assuming that firms do not coordinate), price 
competition between two or more firms in a homogeneous product market is predicted to be 
very intense. By the standard Bertrand logic, firms find it profitable to undercut each other’s 
prices and capture the entire market until prices are driven down to marginal costs. However, 
in the presence of fixed capacity constraints, a degree of market power may be restored (as 
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originally pointed out by Edgeworth). Firms whose competitors do not have enough capacity 
to supply the entire market cannot lose all customers to their competitors and hence have a 
“guaranteed” share of demand that they can exploit. This eliminates their incentives to price 
all the way down to marginal costs where profits would be zero. Instead, at some price level 
above marginal costs, these firms would stop undercutting their rivals as it is more profitable 
to set a high price, which allows them to extract positive profits from their ‘guaranteed’ share 
of demand. The BE framework formalizes this effect. 
In this setting, a merger that results in a substantial consolidation of capacities can lead 
to an increase in the merged entity’s market power. As the merged entity faces less capacity 
from competitors, it has a greater “guaranteed” share of demand which it can exploit 
compared to each of the merging firms pre-merger. This provides the merged entity with an 
incentive to stop undercutting earlier and may lead it to set overall higher prices. 
The BE model needs to be populated with a number of inputs in order to generate a 
prediction on pre-merger and post-merger outcomes. These include the level of market 
demand at prevailing market prices, the level of capacity available to each competing firm and 
their variable costs, the price elasticity of aggregate demand, and the price responsiveness of 
sales by producers located outside the geographic area that is the focus of the analysis (e.g., 
imports into the EEA in the case of Outokumpu/Inoxum, and sales into a region defined by the 
Commission as “North-West Europe” in the case of Ineos/Solvay). 
In Outokumpu/Inoxum, a merger between the two largest EEA producers of cold rolled 
stainless steel, the Commission used the BE model as a comprehensive and internally 
coherent framework to jointly test the main arguments made by the merging parties for why 
the transaction would not be expected to increase prices. The Commission took at face value 
the parties’ arguments on the nature of competition, on the responsiveness of demand and 
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imports to prices in the EEA, and on variable cost efficiencies resulting from the transaction 
and combined them with estimates of firms’ (spare) capacity levels and costs to populate a BE 
model. The Commission found that: (1) the parties’ arguments overstated the degree of 
competition in the industry pre-merger to a limited extent (as pre-merger margins predicted by 
the model were somewhat lower than observed margins); and that (2) even accepting the 
parties’ arguments, the significant capacity consolidation brought about by the merger would 
still lead to a reduction in competition (as the model predicted a price increase in the range of 
5–10 percent). The parties’ arguments were hence not sufficient to dispel concerns on 
unilateral price effects resulting from the transaction. The transaction was ultimately cleared 
subject to substantial divestments. 
In Ineos/Solvay, a transaction creating a joint venture between the first and second 
largest producers of commodity suspension polyvinyl chloride (S-PVC) in Northwest Europe 
(NWE), the BE model was initially presented by the merging parties to demonstrate that the 
efficiencies associated with the transaction, combined with the divestment of some productive 
capacity, would be sufficient to prevent a price increase. The Commission reviewed and 
adapted the model submitted by the parties, showing that absent efficiencies and remedies, the 
merger would likely lead to a significant increase in market power. This remained the case 
even if one accepted the entirety of the variable cost efficiency claim made by the merging 
parties (with prices still predicted to rise in the model by 5–20 percent in this case, depending 
on the calibration assumptions). In its final decision, the Commission cleared the merger with 
more extensive remedies than those initially submitted by the merging parties, due to 
concerns about both the competitiveness of some of the assets initially put forward, and the 
initial scope of the remedy package.
21
 
11 
 
Direct estimation of the impact of past events 
In some recent merger cases, the Commission has relied on quantitative techniques to 
estimate directly the impact of past events. In what follows, we will focus on two main 
applications of these techniques: the industrial chemicals merger Ineos/Solvay, and a merger 
in the coffee industry. In the first application (industrial chemicals), the Commission carried 
out an ex-post evaluation of recent past mergers in the same industry to gain insight into the 
likely effects of a proposed merger as well as on a geographic market delineation question 
(see also Section 2.1.1 of the U.S. Merger Guidelines). In the second application (coffee 
systems in the DEMB/Mondelēz merger case22), the Commission estimated the impact of past 
entry events by one merging firm’s coffee systems into various geographic markets on the 
pricing of the other merging firm’s coffee system. This analysis focused on the closeness of 
competition between the different systems. (This type of evidence is also mentioned in 
Section 2.1.2 of the U.S. Merger Guidelines).23 
The common trait of these applications is that they use information on markets 
affected by past events, such as entry or previous mergers, and compare these markets to other 
markets that were not affected by the events. This is to shed light on the competitive 
interaction between the merging parties. The markets to be compared can be different product 
or geographic markets. In the two cases discussed below, the Commission used different 
geographic markets as comparators. 
The impact of an entry, exit, or past merger event can be used as evidence of the 
closeness of competition between different products or firms. If, for example, a new 
competitor enters a geographic market and offers a close substitute for the incumbent’s 
product, the price of the incumbent product is expected to decrease following the entry. 
Hence, the evolution of the incumbent product’s price before and after the entry can be a 
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valuable source of information on the actual strength or closeness of competition between the 
incumbent’s and the newly entered rival’s products. The stronger the price decrease of the 
incumbent’s product following the rival’s entry, the stronger the likely competitive 
interaction. 
While conceptually simple, the econometric measurement of such effects can be 
complex. Simple comparisons of the affected market’s prices before and after an event might 
be misleading because the price changes can also be the result of other factors influencing 
market outcomes, such as changes in costs or demand conditions. For example, if prices have 
a decreasing tendency even before and independently of the event, one would falsely attribute 
the lower post-entry average price level as an effect of the entry—even if the entry did not 
actually impact prices. 
The problem can be alleviated by a number of techniques that isolate the effect 
attributable to the event from the effect of other factors. One approach, which has been used 
in the recent cases discussed here, is based on comparing the evolution of prices in the 
affected market (the “treated” market) to the evolution of prices in other geographic markets 
for the same product—with otherwise similar demand and cost conditions—where no entry or 
other event occurred. These other markets are referred to as the “control” markets or control 
group. 
The control group is assumed to represent how the treated market would have behaved 
had the entry (or exit or merger) event not happened. Importantly, the control markets form a 
valid basis of comparison if they have the same characteristics as the treated market but for 
the effect of the event studied. If the prices do not change significantly in the control markets 
when the event happens in the treated market, and the prices do change in the latter following 
the event, it is more likely that this price change is attributable to the event. Similarly (in the 
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case of an entry event), if prices have already been decreasing in both markets, entry might 
result in a more rapid decrease of prices in the treated market compared to the control 
markets. If, however, the control markets’ prices decrease similarly during the same time 
periods, the effect is less likely to be an entry effect. This methodology of double comparison 
(comparing first within-market pre-event prices with post-event prices, and second comparing 
these price changes across the different markets) is also called the “difference-in-differences” 
methodology.24 The difference-in-differences methodology can also be used to measure the 
(average) effect of several events that take place in different geographic markets (at the same 
time or at different times).25 
In a merger context, it is important to emphasise the proper interpretation of the 
outcomes of such difference-in-differences analyses. Even though the price effect estimates 
can be thought of as a direct quantification of the impact of the past merger (or entry or exit) 
events, care has to be taken in interpreting them as estimates of the effect of future mergers.26 
In the cases discussed below, the impact estimates of past events were rather used as evidence 
helping to establish whether conditions conducive to anticompetitive effects of the proposed 
transactions prevailed prior to them. These conditions could include close competition 
between the merging parties, existing market power of one or both of the parties, or market 
delineation patterns indicating the lack of sufficient competitive constraints on the markets 
where the merging firms are active. 
As in the case of simulation methods discussed in the previous section, the results of 
the direct estimation methods were used in conjunction with the available qualitative 
information on file (market interviews, internal documents, etc.) to form the assessment of the 
proposed transactions. 
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Ex-post analysis as a merger assessment tool in the chemicals industry27 
In Ineos/Solvay the Commission used, in addition to the Bertrand-Edgeworth simulation 
model (discussed in the first part of this article), a quantitative difference-in-differences 
analysis of past mergers in the industry. Prior to the transaction, the S-PVC industry had 
already seen two previous mergers, both involving Ineos. In particular, Ineos bought a 
competitor in 2008 with production assets in the UK and Scandinavia, and purchased another 
firm in 2011 with factories in the Benelux countries and France. As a result, by the time of the 
notified transaction Ineos had grown into the clear market leader. 
Ineos’ previous mergers made it possible to analyse the effect of consolidation on 
competition and prices in a direct effect estimation framework. The Commission collected 
detailed, transaction level datasets from both merging parties covering the 2007–2012 period 
on a monthly basis. The data included invoices, values and volumes of transactions, 
information on the location of customers and production plants, as well as technical 
characteristics of the products and their costs. The treated and control markets were defined 
geographically: the treated group was the set of transactions belonging to regions affected by 
the past mergers, while the transactions in non-affected regions formed the control group. 
In particular, the difference-in-differences-based comparative analysis contributed to 
answering three key questions in the case. First, an issue to be investigated was whether Ineos 
already possessed market power prior to the proposed transaction, which would have made 
this merger more likely to be anticompetitive. Second, if the past mergers resulted in 
significant price increases, the analysis could provide evidence on the regional segmentation 
of the European market. In particular, the question was whether the NWE region was or was 
not sufficiently constrained by competition from the Rest of Europe (ROE). Third, an ex-post 
analysis of the previous mergers could indicate whether the assumptions that were made in 
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the respective clearance decisions might have to be revisited. These assumptions mainly 
involved the existence of sufficient rival spare capacity, customers’ ability to switch supplier, 
and EEA and import competition as effective competitive constraints on the merging parties. 
The Commission used two versions of the difference-indifferences analysis. The first 
version compared Ineos’s prices in the NWE region to those in the ROE regions, and 
calculated how much the price difference between the two regions increased after the two 
previous mergers. Hence in this version, the previous mergers focused on the NWE region so 
customer transactions in this region formed the treated group, and those from the ROE regions 
were the control group. The second version compared Ineos’s price premium relative to 
Solvay between NWE and ROE, and analyzed whether the regional difference in the price 
premium increased after the mergers. The second version of the methodology is likely to 
underestimate the effect of the past mergers, as Solvay might have reacted to these 
transactions by increasing its prices due to the reduced overall competition in the market. As 
such, finding a merger effect on the price premium would be considered strong evidence of 
merger-induced unilateral price effects. 
The results indicated that past consolidation (in particular the previous 
Ineos/Tessenderlo merger) led to price increases, both in an absolute sense (first version), and 
on the Ineos price premium relative to Solvay’s prices (second version). These results, 
combined with the evidence on volume changes in the treated market, led to the conclusion 
that Ineos already had a degree of market power prior to the proposed transaction; that the 
NWE region was a separate geographic market;28 and, as a result, the assumptions that 
allowed the Commission to clear the previous mergers (spare capacity, customer switching, 
and strong EEA and import competitors) could not be relied upon in the assessment of the 
proposed transaction. 
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As already mentioned, the impact estimates of past merger events cannot be 
conclusively interpreted as estimates of the effect of future mergers. Accordingly, as 
described above, the evidence was rather used to establish existing market power and 
conditions conducive to anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction. This finding and 
a large body of other qualitative and quantitative evidence (including extensive documentary 
evidence on the impact of past consolidation, data on the evolution of volumes after past 
consolidation, evidence on limited spare capacity by rivals, as well as the simulation 
modelling discussed in the first part of this article) jointly provided the basis for the 
conclusion that the proposed merger would lead to a significant impediment to effective 
competition. 
Entry and exit in the coffee systems markets 
In DEMB/Mondelēz, a joint venture case between two leading coffee manufacturers, one of 
the important issues was competition between coffee systems.29 Traditionally, coffee was 
mostly prepared as “multi-serve” drinks (such as drip filter coffee using ground coffee 
powder) with several cups of coffee brewed simultaneously. More recently, single-serve 
systems, which generally brew only a single cup of coffee at a time, have also become 
popular. Such “coffee systems” are comprised of coffee machines and coffee consumables 
(e.g., capsules and filter pads) that can be used only with the specific machine. In Europe, 
several coffee systems belong to this segment, most prominently Nestlé’s Nespresso, Nestlé’s 
Dolce Gusto, DEMB’s Senseo, and Mondelēz's Tassimo.30  
Single-serve coffee systems are differentiated with respect to the type of coffee they 
make (from filter style coffee to espresso style); whether they are limited to black coffee or 
whether they produce milky or flavored variations; and whether the system is closed or open 
(i.e., whether or not consumables can also be bought from third-party providers). The 
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qualitative evidence (from internal documents and market participants) indicated that the 
Tassimo brand was primarily competing with Dolce Gusto, while Senseo (which is closer to 
filter coffee) was a more distant competitor to these two brands and Nespresso. The merging 
parties also argued that their two systems did not exercise a strong competitive constraint on 
each other. However, Nestlé, a complainant, argued that the Senseo and Tassimo brands were 
closer competitors to each other than Tassimo and Dolce Gusto. 
To assess the issue, the Commission complemented its qualitative analysis by a 
quantitative study of the entry of Mondelēz's Tassimo into several countries. While the 
merging firms are directly active in the “aftermarket” or “secondary market” for consumables, 
they are only indirectly active in the “primary market” for machines, through long-term 
design and development co-operations to various extents with machine manufacturers.31 
Nevertheless, coffee manufacturers can and do influence machine prices indirectly through 
promotional activities and subsidies. Hence, the Commission investigated the merger’s 
potential impact on the market for single-serve machines. The quantitative assessment 
focused on the sale of machines to shed light on the degree of competition between coffee 
systems. This assessment was complemented by a qualitative analysis of the links between the 
primary and after markets.32  
The data collected covered 21 European countries for the period 2004 to 2014. During 
this period the Tassimo system was introduced in eight countries, Nestlé’s Dolce Gusto was 
present in 20 countries, and DEMB’s Senseo was present in ten. The Commission used two 
separate econometric models to assess the impact of Tassimo’s entry on (1) Dolce Gusto and 
(2) Senseo machine prices, respectively. In the Dolce Gusto analysis the treated geographic 
markets were those countries where a Tassimo entry event happened in a given month, while 
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the control group included those countries where Dolce Gusto was present but there was no 
Senseo entry at the same time. A similar structure was used for the Senseo analysis. 
These econometric models used the difference-in-differences methodology comparing 
the average percent price drop for Dolce Gusto (or Senseo, respectively) machines following 
the Tassimo entry with the evolution of the average Dolce Gusto (or Senseo, respectively) 
machine prices during the same period in the countries where no such entry happened. 
The results showed that the entry of Tassimo was associated, on average, with a 
decrease in the prices of both Senseo machines and Dolce Gusto machines. These estimated 
price responses were statistically significant for Dolce Gusto machines but not for Senseo 
machines. Hence, these quantitative outcomes indicated that Tassimo represented some 
competitive constraint for both types of rival machines, but with the effect of Tassimo’s entry 
on Dolce Gusto’s prices being stronger than on Senseo’s prices (both in terms of magnitude 
and statistical significance).33 Hence, these findings were consistent with Tassimo being 
closer to Dolce Gusto than to Senseo, as indicated by the qualitative evidence. These results 
proved robust when subject to extensive robustness checks.34 
As the merging firms are primarily active in the aftermarkets, the results of the 
quantitative analysis were not directly indicative of the likely effect of the merger on the 
single-serve machine market. Rather, they showed which particular single-serve systems 
compete more vigorously with each other. In this respect, the merging firms were not 
necessarily each other’s closest competitors. The qualitative and descriptive evidence 
obtained by the Commission further documented that other factors, such as the incentive to 
increase the penetration of machines, especially in the case of more recent entrants, such as 
Tassimo, implied that the incentive to raise machine prices following the merger would likely 
be muted. This finding was further reinforced by the degree of contractual independence of 
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the machine manufacturers from the coffee firms and their incentive to increase machine 
penetration. 
Overall, the Commission concluded that both the qualitative and quantitative evidence 
indicated that the merger would not lead to a significant loss of competition in the segment of 
single-serve coffee machines. The transaction was cleared without commitments related to 
machines. 
Conclusion 
In this article we have described the use of merger simulations and direct estimation 
techniques by the European Commission in recent merger cases. These quantitative 
techniques can be useful to assess certain key features of proposed mergers in an internally 
coherent quantitative approach. 
For example, merger simulation techniques can provide quantitative indications on 
whether observed measures of substitutability between the products in the market are such 
that the elimination of competition through the merger is likely to lead to significant unilateral 
price effects; whether spare capacities by non-merging firms are likely to exert a sufficient 
competitive constraint on the merged entity; or whether claimed efficiencies are likely to 
offset an increase in market power resulting from a merger. 
Direct estimation of the effects of past entry events or mergers can also be informative 
on competitive interactions or on whether past mergers have led to increased market power. 
The Commission selects quantitative techniques which are suited to quantitative 
analysis of particular markets, both in terms of data availability and in terms of the 
applicability of the basic premises underlying the analysis (e.g., the presence of high barriers 
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to entry in the case of merger simulation techniques or the comparability of the treated and 
control markets in the case of the direct estimation techniques). 
While such techniques may allow a quantitative assessment of certain key aspects of a 
proposed merger, they typically cannot take account of all important features of the industry 
and require reliable data to derive their predictions. The Commission therefore reads the 
results of such quantitative techniques in conjunction with a careful analysis of the available 
qualitative evidence. 
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